Do I contradict myself? Very well then I contradict myself, (I am large, I contain multitudes.) -Walt Whitman 'Song Of Myself' Max Weber (1864-1920 is one of the founders of sociology, and is remembered especially as the great theorist of bureaucratic rationalisation. This, according to Weber, is a deep and ancient tendency in our civilisation. To take as an example the context I know best, we university academics see bureaucratic rationalisation happening every day in our universities and in education generally. As the head of an academic department, I have to contribute to it, and sometimes to enforce it. Weber persuades me that it is inevitable, and daily work persuades me that sometimes it is a good thing-we would not wish our curricula or assessment procedures to be whimsical or arbitrary. At the same time, it is clear to me, as it was clear to Weber, that rationalisation comes at a cost in spontaneity and flexibility. That matters in education because learning is unpredictable and unruly. Flashes of insight can be planned for, but they cannot be programmed. Therefore, we academics have to think about how to practise an anarchic activity in a rationalised environment.
Weber and Coyote: polytheism as a practical attitude
Do I contradict myself? Very well then I contradict myself, (I am large, I contain multitudes.)
-Walt Whitman 'Song Of Myself'
Max Weber (1864 Weber ( -1920 is one of the founders of sociology, and is remembered especially as the great theorist of bureaucratic rationalisation. This, according to Weber, is a deep and ancient tendency in our civilisation. To take as an example the context I know best, we university academics see bureaucratic rationalisation happening every day in our universities and in education generally. As the head of an academic department, I have to contribute to it, and sometimes to enforce it. Weber persuades me that it is inevitable, and daily work persuades me that sometimes it is a good thing-we would not wish our curricula or assessment procedures to be whimsical or arbitrary. At the same time, it is clear to me, as it was clear to Weber, that rationalisation comes at a cost in spontaneity and flexibility. That matters in education because learning is unpredictable and unruly. Flashes of insight can be planned for, but they cannot be programmed. Therefore, we academics have to think about how to practise an anarchic activity in a rationalised environment.
i This tension between anarchic activity and rationalised structure is not unique to education. It is found in any occupation where learning or creativity coexist with imperatives towards efficiency or reliability.
My understanding of the anarchic end of this dialectical dyad will mostly come from Lewis Hyde's book
Trickster Makes This World: how disruptive imagination creates culture. ii Hyde explores myths about tricksters such as the Yoruba spirit Eshu, the Greek Hermes, the Norse Loki and the Coyote and Raven stories of some of the native cultures of North America. He is particularly interested in the importance of trickery in stories about how the world came to be the way it is. Note that these examples all come from polytheisms. Hyde makes few references to the Abrahamic faiths, even though they share the story of the fall, brought about by the serpent's trickery, and the god of the Old Testament plays a few tricks of His own. Early in his book, Hyde asks whether trickster is with us now and considers that the answer may be 'no', because "trickster only comes to life in the complex terrain of polytheism"
(pp. 9-10). If that is true, and if we need trickster to create and re-create the world, and if we in the UK (and similar societies) are a deeply monotheistic culture, then we are in trouble. However, Weber offers grounds for optimism on this point. Writing in 1918, he claimed that:
Many old gods ascend from their graves; they are disenchanted and hence take the form of impersonal forces. They strive to gain power over our lives and again they resume their eternal struggle with one another.
iii As we will see, there are in Weber's view some new gods vying for control over and sacrifice from humanity as well as the old ones. If Weber is right, and the winter of monotheism is giving way to a new polytheism (albeit of a disenchanted sort) then perhaps the trickster can live among us after all.
The plan of this paper, therefore, is to elaborate some basic notions from Weber (rationalisation, disenchantment, bureaucracy) , to explore Hyde's thesis in more detail, and then to take up this question of the plurality of spirits both around and within us, and whether the trickster is one of them. Weber has three roles in this argument. First, he theorises rationalisation, disenchantment and bureaucracy;
second, he offers an argument that in a certain sense polytheism is returning (if it ever went away); and third, he presents a way to translate the mytho-poetic register in which Hyde works into terms acceptable to social science of a more materialist bent. We saw this last role in the quotation above; his resurgent old gods are impersonal social forces. This allows us to draw on Hyde without falling into mystery-mongering.
Rationalisation, disenchantment and bureaucracy
"The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the 'disenchantment of the world.'" iv Rationalisation, in Weber's work, is a steady tendency towards system, order, standardisation, repetition, measurement, intellectualisation, explicit rules and calculated efficiency and effectiveness, in more or less all domains of life. Methods of farming and cooking that were justified by tradition lose out to scientifically tested methods. Society 1250-1600. Cosby explains, for example, the process whereby music came to be written in a standardised notation and consequently became increasingly homogenised. He relates the rapid introduction of public clocks from the early fourteenth century onwards (chapter four) and the consequent introduction of standardised hours and routines. To take an example close to scholarly life, Crosby explains how the medieval schoolmen found themselves overwhelmed with texts and had to find some system for ordering and retrieving them. Their first library catalogues ordered material in descending order of importance, starting with the Bible. This proved impractical, so they began to put texts in alphabetical order as we still do today (p. 63). As Crosby shows, it was not long before Europeans quantified more or less everything, for practical reasons, and not because they were in the grip of an ideology that drove them to it. And in order to quantify space, time, music and so on, these magnitudes have to be divided into standard units. The last Weberian concept that I wish to introduce is bureaucracy. Weber inherited from his parents a practical interest in German politics, and when he writes about bureaucracy, it is worth keeping the late nineteenth-century German civil service in mind. Bureaucracy, for Weber, is the result of rationalisation in the realm of human organisation. What he calls the pure type of bureaucracy is "superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus makes possible a particularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads of the organization and for those acting in relation to it." vii He considers it to be the most efficient way of controlling people. This pure type of bureaucracy is characterised as follows:
1) officials are free citizens (as opposed to, say, the scribe-slaves of ancient empires)
2) strict hierarchy Weber includes large private corporations in his analysis. The difference between public and private ownership is not decisive of whether an organisation counts as a bureaucracy in Weber's sense. To reiterate: the existence of such bureaucracies is not the result of a 'bureaucratic mentality'-rather, there are bureaucrats with a bureaucratic mentality because the practical needs of our society demand bureaucracies.
Much of this may seem familiar and obvious, but that is because we no longer live in a society where, for example, military commissions, church livings and judgments in lower courts can be bought. On the other hand, for the past four decades or so, there has been a challenge to Weber's claim that this type of organisation is the most efficient. There is now a market-based, 'entrepreneurial' model that (of the characteristics just listed) is opposed to 2, suspicious of 3, 4 and 5, and positively contemptuous of 6. The 'entrepreneurial' spirit wants to flatten hierarchies, does not care about qualifications or processes except as they affect results, and does not understand why an official would work hard if there is no financial incentive. It is this spirit viii that, for example, wishes to replace certification of school-teachers with payment by results. The principal argument in favour of this view is that market mechanisms calculate efficiencies more finely than bureaucracies, and motivate people to improve. 
Tricksters
The subtitle of the second edition of Hyde's book is how disruptive imagination creates culture. Understanding this, rather than simply cataloguing myths about tricky gods and spirits, is his real aim. His focus is on art, though disruptive imagination has a place in science too.
x I first learned of Hyde's book from the mathematician Michael Harris. He got interested in tricksters when one of his mathematical innovations was described as 'Harris's tensor trick', and he wondered how to take this epithet. xi A trick is not a method. It exploits the specifics of the problem it solves more in the opportunistic manner of the Greek military camp than the Roman approach. 'Method', on the other hand, suggests the uniform procedure of the Roman camp. The trickster seeks to take imaginative advantage of features of the situation that a more methodical approach might miss. The moral ambiguity of the term arises from the cases where the situation includes other people.
Hyde proceeds by exploring myths about tricky spirits from all over the world. He recognises the danger of forming a composite out of figures from many different traditions, but his aim is rather to use these stories to say something about intelligence, imagination and culture. Indeed, I suspect that his confidence that the stories can be usefully juxtaposed arises from a conviction that they express some common human truths. The most obvious things that his tricksters tend to have in common are theft and deceit, a kind of 'Artful Dodger' intelligence and boldness of action that gets them into trouble as often as it brings rewards. They are marginal figures, often found on roads or at crossroads rather than in the settlement where the rule of law prevails. However, they are not just thieves and conartists. Their schemes are cosmically significant. They steal important things (fire, water, daylight, agriculture and the like) from important people (usually other mythological personages). They are often the mediators between gods and humans. This places them at the margin of divine society. Hermes, the messenger of the Olympian gods, had to steal cattle from Apollo and (effectively) sacrifice them to himself in order to become a real god (and being a self-made god, is as much a parvenu as a self-made man). Loki is never really welcome in Asgard. person's eyes. It's notable that apart from tricksters, this ability is quite rare among gods and mythological beings. This makes tricksters dangerous, but it also equips them to be effective mediators.
One of the stories with a direct bearing on this paper is Ragnarok, the doom of the Norse gods. Baldr, the son of Odin and Frigg, is the god of light and purity. He has a prophetic dream about his own death. His mother Frigg travels the world to extract from everything a promise not to harm her son, but she overlooks mistletoe. Loki makes an arrow out of mistletoe and gives it to a blind god during an archery contest in which the gods celebrate Baldr's invulnerability by using him as a target. Under Loki's guidance, the blind god shoots Baldr dead. To punish Loki, and to prevent further mischief, the gods bind Loki. This, though, causes the world to die and the gods with it. It is only when Loki is freed that the world and the gods are reborn. In Hyde's reading of this myth, Loki has to react to Frigg's attempt to save her son from contingency, danger and death because he is the god of such uncertainties. Frigg's effort is an attack on him. The gods raise the stakes when they bind Loki-they try to drive contingency, danger and death out of the world altogether, but their effort is fatal because without contingency, danger and death, there can be no life.
xiii I mentioned at the outset Hyde's suggestion that "trickster only comes to life in the complex terrain of polytheism" (pp. 9-10). The first reason for this is that the trickster plays his role in shaping the cosmos by tricking gods. This is only possible with the sort of limited, specialised gods who are open to trickery. There is no fooling the all-knowing, all-powerful god of the Abrahamic faiths. Some tricks bring material benefits to humanity (fire, agriculture) while others change the ethical landscape. That ought not be possible if the moral law is given by the absolute authority of the unlimited god of monotheism.
Moreover, the trickster is the god of radical contingency, but a universe governed by the eternal, absolute authority of the god of Abraham can have no real contingency in it. Things may look radically contingent to us finite creatures, but in Abrahamic monotheism the divine mind knows and approves of everything that happens and will happen. A third reason is that the absolutely powerful god of Abraham needs no mediator to communicate with humanity. The god of monotheism speaks to Abraham directly. When this God, rather than speak directly to a prophet, sends an angel with a message, the angel is an entirely reliable mouthpiece for God. xiv The trickster-mediators, in contrast, may spin or invent messages for their own tricky purposes, unbeknownst to the limited gods whose messages they carry. The trickster-mediator expresses in the mytho-poetic register the unreliability of all communication, whereas the Abrahamic faiths all suggest, one way or another, that it is possible to received the word of God in a reliable form.
xv Finally, the trickster needs polytheism because he is a god (or at least some sort of mythic being), and could not possibly be the only one. No human being can be a trickster spirit any more than an ordinary coyote can be Coyote. 'Trickster coming to life' means that his spirit is one of the social forces shaping our world, along with the bureaucrat, the entrepreneur, the politician, and so on.
Weber's 'polytheism'
These, then, are our two spirits, the bureaucrat and the trickster. These are the gods of the two tendencies in modern life that we encountered at the outset-on one side, the rationalising tendency of academic quality assurance and standardised summative assessment, and on the other the exuberant anarchy of fizzing ideas. Now, we need Weber to argue that we do in fact live in the 'complex terrain of polytheism' (the second of his three functions in this paper between the proper ethical order of politics, which demands that the political leader must be prepared to use violence and take responsibility for the consequences of policy, and any 'ethics of absolute ends'
(such as the Sermon on the Mount) that insists that consequences are not important next to the imperative to do the right thing. As Weber put it, the saint is commanded "resist not him that is evil with force", but "for the politician the reverse proposition holds, 'thou shalt resist evil by force,' or else you are responsible for evil winning out." (pp. 119-120).
xvi Even if we do not consider an ethic of ultimate ends, there is a contrast in Weber's writing between the ethical demands on the political leader and those on the civil servant. The political leader is an advocate, for policy, for party advantage, for the interests of some social group or class, and ultimately for the politician's own convictions and claims on power. The civil servant (in the ideal type of bureaucracy described above), on the other hand, must not advocate anything, but must rather be the reliable instrument of decisions made higher up. "The honor of the civil servant is vested in his ability to execute conscientiously the order of the superior authorities, exactly as if the order agreed with his own conviction. Without this moral discipline and self-denial, in the highest sense, the whole apparatus would fall to pieces." (p. 95). The good leader and the good civil servant are committed to different ethical orders. If these were personified as gods, the deities would have different characters, expressed in different myths. Of course, human politicians and civil servants must be subject to ethical demands other than those of their professions, be it the god of love, or Christian charity, or Kantian rectitude or some other such ethic. Otherwise, the demand of professional ethics on politicians that they be prepared to use violence when necessary would allow any end to justify any means, and the honour of civil servants would require them to be the willing instruments of any policy, however evil. This is the 'inner tension' between the demands of different spirits.
Weber generalised this thought. Considering the suggestion that there could be a single ethical code to govern all human life, he asked (rhetorically, expecting a negative answer), "But is it true that any ethic of the world could establish commandments of identical content for erotic, business, familial, and official relations; for the relations to one's wife, to the greengrocer, the son, the competitor, the friend, the defendant?" (pp. 118-9). Part of the point of these two 'vocation' lectures is that the political leader and the scientist are committed to different ethical orders. The leader must offer a moral vision and recommend action; the scientist must not-the scientific ethic forbids it.
This multiplicity of ethical orders is a feature of all societies, but Weber argues that some handle it better than others. Polytheisms do it best; they simply have different gods associated with different ethical orders. "We are placed into various life-spheres, each of which is governed by different laws. Religious ethics have settled with this fact in different ways. Hellenistic polytheism made sacrifices to Aphrodite and Hera alike, to Dionysus and Apollo, and knew these gods were frequently in conflict with one another." (p. 123). The ease with which ancient polytheists simultaneously venerated gods of apparently differing ethical orders is what Weber meant by 'inwardly genuine plasticity'. Such a person can supplicate the goddess of unruly passion while at the same time paying due respect to the goddess of faithful matrimony, simply by not thinking too much about the contradiction. The multiplicity of ethical orders is more of a problem for us, because our world and our action in it is rationalised, theorised, intellectualised, and therefore such contradictions are harder for us to ignore. In philosophy, the two modern giants of moral thought, Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, took it for granted that there is a single moral system-they devoted their efforts to working out what it is.
xvii Medieval Christendom too had its distinct ethical orders: "There stands the monk who must not shed blood or strive for gain, and beside him stand the pious knight and the burgher, who are allowed to do so, the one to shed blood and the other to pursue gain." (p. 124). The fiction that monk, knight and burgher were all governed by the same ethical order was sustained for a while by doctrinal footwork, but this, Weber, maintains, is no longer possible: "our civilization destines us to realize more clearly these struggles again, after our eyes have been blinded for a thousand years-blinded by the allegedly or presumably exclusive orientation towards the exclusive moral fervor of Christian These studies of religion were extensive, and one might wonder whether there is a connection to be made between Weber the sociologist of religion and Weber the theorist of modern 'polytheism'.
In fact, there is no direct link between the 'polytheism' material (which is mostly found in his two 'vocation' essays) and his sociology of religion, in part because the latter is focussed on the various 'salvation' religions, which are mostly either monotheistic or non-theist (Buddhism we wished to defend Weber on this point, we might remember that his sociology of religion was mostly about salvation religions that in some sense 'reject the world', and so its analytical machinery has no bearing on the disenchanted, worldly 'polytheism' that he discussed in his 'vocations' essays. In any case, the justice of Friesland's criticism need not concern us, because no part of the present argument appeals to or depends upon Weber's sociology of religion.
Weber uses the language of polytheism to make two points. The first is his view that we live among multiple incompatible ethical orders. The second is his contrast between the ease with which ancient polytheistic religious cultures dealt with this ethical multiplicity (aided by their mystical inward plasticity) and the difficulty that we have in our rationalised, intellectualised culture. He does not suppose that these 'gods' are beings who might be summoned or supplicated, or who might intervene in human affairs, or that anyone thinks of them in such terms. For him, the mytho-poetic register is a façon de parler rather than a metaphysical commitment. is tempting to seek some higher-level account that will resolve all ethical conflicts, rather than to recognise that there may be irresolvably tragic dilemmas in life. However, most people are not principally driven by such demands of theoretical reason, so monotheism must have some other appeal.
Its political advantages are obvious. The earthly representative of the One True God need brook no opposition, while the king-priest of one god among many has to pay at least formal respect to the others. xxiii Moreover, extinct polytheisms of the sort that Weber had in mind tend to be morally and psychologically unsatisfying. Odin and Zeus may look on humanity benignly, but no member of any pantheon loves you the way Jesus is said to. Nor do such polytheisms guarantee cosmic justice. xxiv Souls may be weighed after death, but on the whole restorative justice is not a big part of the polytheist offer. Polytheisms recognise the radical contingency of life-that is one reason why tricksters need polytheism. But anxious, suffering humanity hankers after the certainties of one god, whose one truth has been written down once and for all in one book, and the unconditional love of an infinitely wise, powerful and benevolent heavenly father.
These are (admittedly speculative) reasons why people might wish to resist Weber's argument for the multiplicity of ethical orders. However, there is a philosophical argument against Weber's view that arises from consideration of the unity of the person and the integrity of a life. xxv According to this argument, it is both psychologically unhealthy and ethically undesirable for a person to be committed to rival ethical orders and for a life to be compartmentalised between them. These views tend to see good mental health and ethically good living combining into a broad notion of 'human flourishing' or eudaimonia. A life in which one lives by one ethic at work and another at home is said to lack integrity. Beset by cognitive dissonance, according to this view, the compartmentalised individual cannot flourish fully. There is certainly something to this, especially if someone behaves, speaks and thinks as if the ethic of one life-compartment were the universal morality, only to adopt different, allegedly universal principles in another. However, the fault here lies in the notion of a single morality (together with the intellectualisation of ethics) rather than the compartmentalisation. Persons with genuine mystical inner plasticity would not feel the cognitive dissonance (though they would still have to resolve practical dilemmas between ethical orders).
Moreover, it's far from obvious that relentless consistency is necessarily a good thing. Someone who sticks to one ethical order will make a bad job of other aspects of life. Great political leaders are often not very good parents; voters who assess every policy solely in terms of its effects on their own children are not the best citizens. There is a picture of the human psyche due to Nietzsche and Freud in which a human personality is not a simple unit, as Descartes (for example) imagined. Rather, the 'soul' of a human is a sort of society of personas, ancestral voices, inherited tendencies and ingrained habits. " (p. 127) . This 'unison' is not easy to achieve, but rather requires "trained relentlessness in viewing the realities of life, and the ability to face such realities and to measure up to them inwardly"
(pp. 126-7). Even so, there may be insolvable conflicts between them, in which case the best we can do may be to recognise such conflicts clearly, without denial or bad faith, and claim as our own whatever decision we make. One of the attractive promises of monotheism is to relieve us of this existential strain by offering to resolve such conflicts.
My conviction, for which I have not argued adequately here, is that Weber is right about the multiple ethical orders. This means that there will be tragic occasions when ethical demands conflict, and there is no higher system or authority to resolve them. Monotheism cannot deliver on this promise. The paradigm for this is Antigone, caught between equally pressing loyalties to family and city. It also means that we will carry these divisions and conflicts between ethical orders within us, and feel them sometimes as dilemmas, as cognitive dissonance or as ethical paralysis. Too bad! Hyde suggests that trickster spirits can help on these occasions-and perhaps they might-but they are unreliable. It would have taken a very slippery trick to save Antigone.
The trickster's role in practical polytheism
We seem to have come a long way from the original questions about anarchy and order in modern life. What does all this stuff about gods and Antigone mean for that agenda? The first task in this concluding section is to descend from the mytho-poetic plane. These various gods and spirits are really social forces. They show themselves in the cultures and structures of society, or not at all. They are active forces (rather than dead cultural forms) because they are also part of our psyches. To call them beliefs would be to over-intellectualise them. The official who shudders inwardly when a decision is not properly recorded does not merely believe a proposition about bureaucracy, nor does the hustling entrepreneur merely believe some piece of theory about market economics. Their gods are alive within them; they feel and act on their commitment to their respective ethical orders. There is no magic here, just a meeting of culture, psychology and ethics.
Hyde himself offers a descending staircase from the mytho-poetic plane to a more practical level: it is open to human powers, people, institutions and traditions to maintain that double standard. In particular, it offers a modus vivendi to the ill-matched spirits of anarchic learning and orderly administration, of creativity and bureaucracy.
In mytho-poetic terms, polytheism requires recognising and respecting the servants of many gods. Speaking prosaically, to take the university as an example, the stickler for human resources processes, the academic quality assurance pedant, the absentee researcher and the dedicated classroom teacher are all doing their proper offices according to their own ethical orders. None of these gods is an absolute authority-including the god of classroom teaching, whose hierophants can be as tiresomely pious as any other true believers. Moreover, in cases of conflict, there is no recipe for a resolution. As the stories of strife in Asgard or Olympus remind us, such conflicts are decided by a combination of practical wisdom and personal politics-and sometimes, trickery. So here is one practical consequence: that a confrontation between functions is a confrontation between ethical orders that has to be negotiated on the basis of mutual recognition. Furthermore, it is in these circumstances that a trickster might be invoked-provided that all parties to the negotiation recognise trickery as an option. Coyote may help here precisely because he has no way of his own. Unlike the rest of us, the trickster is not subject to déformation professionnelle, that is, he has not been bent out of shape by having to conform to the norms of a professional function. This requires Hyde's 'double standard'. In this, then, is a second practical consequence. Trickery might mean something as simple as using a bureaucratic structure or process for something other than its intended purpose. Computer programmers do this all the time with programming functions, but this is easy for them, because programming functions, unlike bureaucratic functions, are not normally part of someone's ethical order. xxviii Recognising the ethical seriousness of bureaucratic functions (for example), involves paying some respect to their priests, temples and rites. This is especially important precisely on the occasions when one pulls a trick on them.
One place where the trickster spirit appears in corporate life is in the management brainstorming awayday led by a consultant. When this sort of exercise goes well, it is because some elements of the trickster persona have worked together. First, like the man in the Yoruba story, the participants have been taken out of their usual location where they have settled roles, responsibilities and relationships.
An unfamiliar location permits much higher levels of contingency. Second, the consultant is a liminal figure, partly inside and partly outside the organisation. This allows consultants to say what would be otherwise be unsayable. Like the trickster gods, the consultant does not have a place in the hierarchy or a specific area of competence. A consultant, it is said, is the person who borrows your watch to tell you the time; the consultant, like Coyote, has no way of their own but uses the ways of others. The exercises that the consultant asks the participants to carry out may be tricksy because they break down established forms and habits, because they exploit features of human psychology, because the participants can't immediately see their point or because they cannot be used on the same people twice (and are therefore, in mathematical terms, more like tricks than methods). These occasions are often uneasy, even if the participants understand the need for fresh thinking and that they need some help doing it. Part of this unease arises from the knowledge that they are being worked on and manipulated by a trickster (albeit a benevolent one). Part of it may be the natural resentment of honest burghers in fixed occupations towards itinerant opportunists. The consultant seems to make an easy living out of flim-flam rather than doing a proper job. Even without this resentment, though, there is a deeper source of unease. To adjust Hyde's words only slightly, such brainstorming occasions require the senior bureaucrats of the organisation to achieve a double attitude of both insisting that their functions be respected while recognising that in the long run their livelihoods depend on having those functions disturbed. That is a tricky thing to do. You have to think outside your function, knowing that you were only invited to participate in virtue of that very function.
Next, I want to return to the 'Ragnarok' point. Training may be an orderly activity, in which students acquire skills and knowledge by following a 'learning journey' that has been planned by an instructor. Training in a discipline must include the discipline's methods. Students must learn entrenchment in the Roman style. Education, however, requires that students' minds remain lively even as they submit to the demands of their disciplines. We hope that they have insights of their own as well as a grasp of pre-planned curriculum content, and this requires from them an openness to the fizzing together of two apparently unrelated topics or tasks and the unlooked-for opportunities presented by happy accidents. xxix We want students to be able to do tricks with the ideas they gain from their books as well as follow methods. They should have the Greek camp-design option, too. Education requires teachers to allow for unplanned teachable moments in their classrooms, and it requires academic quality and teaching management regimes to recognise the need for contingency and uncertainty. Where authorities attempt to drive contingency out of learning and teaching by (for example) insisting on detailed lesson plans and module and programme descriptions, it's Ragnarok all over again.
Lastly, I want to return to professional ethics. As we saw, Weber claimed that different vocations have ethical orders that are not only different but may well be contradictory. The vocations of politician, bureaucrat and scientist say contradictory things about the holding and enacting of moral visions. We should expect this point to extend into other professions such as law and medicine. xxx For example, a GP has to be an advocate of individual patients, but the official charged with deciding which treatments should be publicly funded must not act with individuals in mind. Moreover, doctors and lawyers have other 'spheres of life' in addition to their vocations, and we should expect these to make ethical demands that are different from and perhaps in conflict with their vocational ethical orders. Just as with
Weber's politicians and civil servants, there should be a place for the god of love, or else we are no more than the sum of our roles and stations. Polytheism as a practical attitude means recognising that there are diverse and contradictory ethical orders built into the world around us and active with our psyches. This may not seem like very comforting knowledge, but at least, when suffering from the resulting existential strain, one has the consoling thought that 'it's not just me'. Moreover, once we recognise that negotiation among ethical authorities, none of whom is absolute, is unavoidable, then we can get on with learning to do it wisely and well. Or if we can't manage wisdom, we can aim for guile.
